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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the problem of decentralization of Pareto optima in
an economy with production externalities to the case where the production
capacities upon which Pareto optimality is defined may differ from the aggre-
gate of the firms expectations about their production possibilities. This issue
is raised in order to deal with the seemingly diiferent exectations of firms and
governments about the economic consequences of climate change. We show
the government can create a “production allowance” market in order to force
the firms to produce in a way it considers as optimal. The results are then
applied to the analysis of the economic and welfare consequences of climate
change.
Key Words: General Equilibrium Theory, Pareto optimality, Externalities.
1 The author is grateful to Professor Jean-Marc Bonnisseau for his guidance and
many useful comments. All remaining errors are mine.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the following decentralization problem: given initial
resources ω and a set of production technologies Z, how can the Pareto op-
tima with regards to Z and ω be decentralized as competitive equilibria in an
economy with general externalities where the individual production technolo-
gies are given by correspondences Yj, sensitive to the other firms production
choices? The standard decentralization problem a` la Arrow-Laffont is encom-
passed in this setting when Z = {z ∈ RL | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) s.t ∑nj=1 yj =
z}, but it also allows us to deal with a more general problem when Z is a
strict subset of {z ∈ RL | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) s.t ∑nj=1 yj = z}. In the latter
case, Z can be interpreted as the information the government has gained on
the aggregate production possibilities in the economy through statistics and
economic studies. It may be less optimistic than the aggregate of the firms ex-
pectations Yj on the production possibilities, which may be erroneous because
firms are imperfectly informed of the long term production possibilities or do
not compute accurately the external effects they face.
The general equilibrium literature on decentralization with externalities was
pioneered by Arrow (2) which builds upon the idea of the Coase theorem
(8) and considers the decentralization of externalities as a problem of miss-
ing market. Arrow defines external effect as a relative notion: the influence
of the use of good x by agent a on agent b, and therefore proposes the
opening of one market of external effect per commodity and per couple of
agents as a mean to restore Pareto optimality. Laffont (11) and Bonnisseau
(4) extended this analysis to encompass consumption externalities and non-
convexities. Another approach is this of Boyd and Conley (7) which consider
externalities as a well defined physical entity: smoke, sulfur dioxide or the
flowers of an orchard. They propose the use of allowances for externalities
as public goods by the pollutees in order to implement Pareto optimality at
a Lindhal like equilibrium. Now all those authors only study the case where
Z = {z ∈ RL | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) s.t ∑nj=1 yj = z} and propose solution
concepts which require the opening of a large number of markets and are sub-
ject to market failures, due to the exiguity of the market and the presence
of non-convexities in the case of Arrow and followers and to the free-riding
problem in the case of Boyd and Conley.
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce the possibility of dif-
ferences between the set of efficient aggregate production techniques Z and
the aggregate of the firms expectations about their production possibilities
{z ∈ RL | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) s.t ∑nj=1 yj = z}. Also the decentralization
mechanism we propose is based on the opening of a single allowance market.
The motivation for introducing a distinction between the set of efficient pro-
duction techniques Z and the aggregate of of the firms expectations Yj comes
from the following remark on the economics of climate change: many of the po-
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tential consequences of climate change, such as changes in agricultural yields
and in localization of crops, disruption of ecosystems or increased vulnera-
bility of physical capital (see the IPCC report (1) for an extensive list) are
likely to affect the production possibilities of economies. On the other hand,
the production sector is partly responsible for climate change because of its
greenhouse gases emissions. We therefore have a typical production externality.
Moreover, the polluters, energy intensive industries, are well identified. How-
ever the potentially damaged firms have never claimed for a compensation and
have even less advocated the opening of markets of allowances thanks to which
they could influence the state of the environment. On the contrary, markets
of allowances for greenhouse emission gases have been launched by govern-
ments after they had limited the firms greenhouse gases emission allowances.
The central idea of this paper is that this divergence between market and
public concern comes from the fact that both have different expectations on
the influence of climate change on future production possibilities. That is the
lack of a spontaneous creation of an emission market can be interpreted as
an aggregate expectation of the production sector that losses due to climate
change are not considerably higher than the transaction costs associated with
the operation of an emission market. Public action is then unnecessary if the
government shares this opinion of the production sector on the influence of
climate change. On the contrary, we argue that the government judges it is
necessary for him to intervene because it doesn’t share the aggregate beliefs
of the producers on their inter-temporal production possibilities. It is indeed
less optimistic.
This conclusion is the rational to build a model which encompasses differences
between the efficient aggregate productions, which represent the government
expectations, and the aggregate of the firms expectations about production
possibilities. We identify thanks to the standard first and second welfare the-
orems the Pareto optima of the economy with the competitive equilibria with
regards to the “government production set” Z and focus on the decentral-
ization of those Pareto optima in the economy with production externalities
described by production correspondences Yj. A possibly puzzling feature of
the model is that, until the application to climate change of the last section,
we do not introduce time explicitly. Even though the problematic is clearly
intertemporal, the density of the general equilibrium model allows us to en-
compass time implicitly by considering that the goods are dated and that
there exist a complete set of markets. The only rational that would remain to
introduce explicitly time is to account for incompleteness of financial markets,
but it seems to us this would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
The solution concept we propose is the opening of a single market of “produc-
tion allowances” which represent the right to lead the aggregate production
away from the efficiency frontier. Indeed the distance to the efficiency frontier
can be seen as a summary of the quantity of “bad” in the economy. This so-
lution concept is on two grounds inspired by the work of Luenberger. First,
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the definition of the production allowance is related to the shortage function
introduced in the literature by Luenberger (12) and Bonnisseau-Cornet (6).
Second the production allowance “alters the individual [profit] functions so
that they correspond to the appropriate social [profit] functions” and “Once
individual [profit] functions are corrected, individual actions, designed to max-
imize these functions, will lead to Pareto efficiency.” (see Luenberger ((13)).
Indeed we show that the opening of a “production allowance” market allows
for decentralization of Pareto optima when the firms are more “optimistic”
than the government as well as in the standard setting of economies with
externalities.
In the last section, we further specify the model and consider explicitly an
economy undergoing climate change. In this framework the production al-
lowance market is needed to transfer the government expectations about cli-
mate change to the firms but an emission allowance market or markets for
external effects a` la Arrow can then be used in order to allocate efficiently the
cost of reducing externalities. A tentative interpretation of our results in this
framework is to state that a precise view of the actions needed to adapt to
climate change is necessary for the firms to address efficiently the mitigation
issue.
2 The model
We consider a general equilibrium economy 2 with a finite number of goods
indexed by ` = 1 · · ·L, a finite number of producers indexed by j = 1 · · ·n, a
finite number of consumers indexed by i = 1 · · ·m and a government.
We allow for general externalities between producers and therefore repre-
sent, following Arrow (2) and Laffont (11), firm j production capacities by
a correspondence Yj : (RL)(n−1) → RL. It associates to an environment 3
y−j ∈ (RL)(n−1) corresponding to the other firms production choices, the set
Yj(y−j) ⊂ RL of production plans firm j then considers as feasible. Such a
representation allows to encompass every possible relation between the pro-
duction process and the environment. We shall assume those characteristics
satisfy the standard assumptions needed to define competitive behavior in
presence of externalities (11):
Assumption (P) For all j, Yj is lower semi-continuous, has a closed graph
2 Notations: RL++ will denote the positive orthant of RL and RL+ its closure. Given
an index set A and a family of elements indexed by A (xa)a∈A, x−a denotes the
family of elements indexed by A − {a}, (xb)b∈A−{a}. Given a convex set X and
x ∈ X, NX(x) denotes the normal cone to X at x and TX(x) the tangent cone to
X at x.
3 y−j denotes the vector (y1, · · · , yj−1, yj+1, · · · yn) ∈ (RL)(n−1).
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and convex values. One has the possibility of inaction: 0 ∈ Yj(0) and free-
production is impossible asymptotically: 4 for all (ζj) ∈ (RL)n, A(∏nj=1 Yj(ζ−j))∩
{(ζj) ∈ (RL)n | ∑nj=1 ζj ≥ 0} = {0}.
The consumers are standard utility maximizers. Following Arrow (2) we do
not take in consideration externalities in the consumption sector as our main
concern is the efficiency of the production process. Agent i consumption set
is RL+ and its preferences are represented by an utility function ui : RL+ → R.
We assume:
Assumption (C) For all i, ui is continuous, quasi-concave and locally non-
satiated. At least one of the ui is strictly monotone.
The initial resources of the economy are set equal to ω ∈ RL++.
On the other hand, we introduce the set, Z ⊂ RL, of production plans the
government considers as feasible in the aggregate. We assume it fits into a
framework a` la Arrow-Debreu (9):
Assumption (G) Z is closed, convex, satisfies free-disposability, production
irreversibility and possibility of inaction.
We shall also assume the government only anticipates production plans that
are technically feasible from the producers point of view:
Assumption (Decentralizability) For all z ∈ Z, there exist (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j)
such that
∑n
j=1 yj = z.
That is, the government can not be more “optimistic” than the firms.
2.1 The government point of view
With regards to the government production set, Z, an allocation (xi) ∈ (RL++)m
is Pareto optimal if
∑m
i=1 xi − ω ∈ Z and if there does not exist an allocation
x′i ∈ RL+ with
∑m
i=1 x
′
i − ω ∈ Z such that ui(x′i) ≥ ui(xi) for all i with a strict
inequality for at least an i0. Note that we focus on the Pareto optima lying
in the interior of the consumption sets. So that, according to the seminal first
and second welfare theorems (9), the set of those Pareto optima coincide with
the competitive equilibria of an economy whose production set is Z. That is:
Proposition 1 An allocation (xi) ∈ (RL++)m is Pareto optimal if and only
if there exist an aggregate production plan z ∈ Z, a price p ∈ RL++ and an
assignment of wealth levels (w1, . . . , wm) with
∑m
i=1wi = p · (z + ω) such that:
4 AZ denotes the asymptotic cone to Z.
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(1) z maximizes profit at price p in Z
(2) xi maximizes ui in the budget set {xi ∈ RL+ | p · xi ≤ wi)}
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi = z + ω
An allocation ((xi), z, p) satisfying conditions (1) to (3) is a competitive equi-
librium “from the government point of view”: it is the type of outcome which
should emerge if the government expectations about the production possi-
bilities are accurate and if the economy follows an efficient productive and
exchange process. Note that the existence of such an equilibrium, and hence
of a Pareto Optimum, is a direct consequence of the standard existence proof
a` la Arrow-Debreu under assumptions [C] and [G]. In the following, taking the
government point of view, we investigate which policies the government can
implement in order to promote the decentralization of these Pareto optima.
2.2 Production Allowance Market
In our framework, competitive behavior of the firms may lead to two types
of failures. The first is a seminal problem in presence of externalities: the
improper aggregation by the commodities prices of the cost of external effects
leads to improper internalization of those effects by the firms (see Laffont
(11)). It may then be that the decentralized choices of the firms lead to an
aggregate production below the efficiency frontier ∂Z.
A second type of failure may occur when the firms are over-optimistic in the
sense that Z is a strict subset of {z ∈ RL | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) s.t ∑nj=1 yj =
z}. It can then be that firms choices correspond to an aggregate production
outside Z which firms might, from the government point of view, finally fail
to produce. This may well disorganize the whole economy and thus lead to
heavy welfare losses. The consideration of such a failure is consubstantial to
the distinction we make between the government and the firms production
sets (which may in particular correspond to different beliefs on the extent of
external effects).
Hence, the government objective is to maintain the aggregate production on
the thin line drawn by the boundary of Z in between inefficiency and unreal-
izability. Due to the welfare losses they cause, inefficiency and unrealizability
may be considered as public bads. It then is very tempting, thinking of the
Coase theorem and of the previous general equilibrium literature on decen-
tralization with externalities (2), (7), (9), to consider the use of a market of
allowances as a mean to overcome these failures. Moreover, given the duality
between inefficiency and unrealizability, a single market might well be suffi-
cient to overcome both failures.
In all generality, we can describe the creation of an allowance market as follows.
The government defines throw an “allowance function” hj : (RL)n → R, the
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quantity of allowances hj(yj, y−j) firm j should use as input in order to produce
yj within an environment (y−j). That is firm j production correspondence is
turned to Gj : (RL)n−1 → RL+1 defined by
Gj(y−j) = {(yj, αj) ∈ RL+1 | yj ∈ Yj(y−j) , αj ≤ −hj(yj, y−j)}.
Competitive behavior of the producers is well defined in this setting provided
the allowance function satisfies the following assumption:
Assumption (Allowance) For all j, for all (yj) ∈ (RL)n the mapping
hj(·, y−j) is continuous, convex and satisfies hj(0, 0) = 0.
On the other hand, the government supplies the economy with a quantity
A ∈ R of allowances by initially allocating the agents (If A < 0 one should
consider the government imposes “initial obligations”). Trades occur on the
market so that each agent might fulfill its requirements. Given a governmental
supply of allowances A ∈ R, we can define a price equilibrium of the economy
with production allowances as:
Definition 1 (Price Equilibrium with Allowances) A collection of pro-
duction plans (yj, αj) ∈
∏n
j=1Gj(y−j) together with a collection of consump-
tion plans (xi) ∈ (RL++)m is a Price Equilibrium with Allowances if there exist
a price (p, q) ∈ RL+1++ and an assignment of wealth levels (w1, . . . , wm) with∑m
i=1wi = (p, q) · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω,
∑n
j=1 αj + A) such that:
(1) For all j,(yj, αj) maximizes profit, (p, q) · (yj, αj), in Gj(y−j);
(2) For all i, xi maximizes ui(xi) in the budget set {xi ∈ RL+ | p · xi ≤ wi};
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω;
(4)
∑n
j=1 αj + A = 0.
2.3 Example of Allowance Functions
The model can represent the actual markets of allowances for greenhouse gases
emissions in Europe or SO2 emissions in the united states, but the types of
allowance we shall consider to obtain positive decentralization results are more
elaborate and more abstract. Their construction is based on the idea that the
level of “bad” in the economy can always be measured by the distance between
the actual production and the production efficiency frontier ∂Z.
In order to construct such allowance functions, the shortage function as defined
in Luenberger [10] and in Bonnisseau-Cornet [4] proves to be very useful.
Given, a reference bundle of commodities γ ∈ RL++, the shortage function for
Z is defined on RL by
g(z) = min{s ∈ R | z − sγ ∈ Z}.
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It provides an intrinsic measure of the distance between the actual production
and the frontier of Z and can be interpreted wether as how many reference
commodity bundles will fail to be produced when the producers are over-
optimistic wether as how many more reference commodity bundles could be
produced if the external effects were properly internalized. It moreover char-
acterize Z in the sense of the following lemma whose proof is straightforward:
Lemma 1 Under assumption (G), g is a convex and continuous function such
that:
(1) z ∈ Z if and only if g(z) ≤ 0;
(2) For every z ∈ ∂Z, NZ(z) =< ∂g(z) > .
Based on this shortage function, one can define firm j allowance function by:
• A share in the aggregate level of “bad”
h1j(yj, y−j) =
g(yj +
∑
k 6=j yk)
n
• The difference between the aggregate level of “bad” when it produces and
this when it does not produce
h2j(yj, y−j) = g(yj +
∑
k 6=j
yk)− g(
∑
k 6=j
yk).
• A convex and increasing transformation of the preceding:
h3j(yj, y−j) = φ(g(yj +
∑
k 6=j
yk))− ψ(g(
∑
k 6=j
yk)).
Thanks to the properties of the shortage function, those functions satisfy
the assumption (Allowance) and the assumption (Exact Compensation) in-
troduced below.
2.4 Decentralization of Pareto optima
In order to allow for decentralization of Pareto optima, the allowance must
compensate the differences between the aggregate (relative to Z) marginal
rates of substitution and the individual ones (relative to Yj):
Assumption (Compensation) For every production plan z associated to
a Pareto Optimum, there exist (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) with ∑nj=1 yj = z and λ > 0
such that for all j,
NZ(
n∑
j=1
yj) ⊂ NYj(y−j(yj) + λ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj).
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Note that the allowance functions h1, h2, and h3 introduced in the preceding
satisfy this condition as they are constructed upon the transformation function
for Z and satisfy < ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) >= NZ(z), while for all (yj) ∈
∏n
j=1 Yj(y−j),
one has 0 ∈ NYj(y−j(yj).
This condition is in fact sufficient to obtain a decentralization result. One has:
Theorem 1 Assume assumptions (P), (C), (G), (Decentralizability), (Al-
lowance) and (Compensation) hold. Any Pareto Optimum can be decentralized
as an equilibrium with allowances.
Proof: Let (z, (xi)) be a Pareto optimal allocation and p the associate equilib-
rium price given by proposition 1. One clearly has p ∈ NZ(z). Under assump-
tion (Decentralizability) and (Compensation) there exist (yj) ∈
∏n
j=1 Yj(y−j)
and q > 0 such that
∑n
j=1 yj = z, and p ∈ NYj(y−j) + q∂hj(·, y−j)(yj). Due to
the convexity of Gj(y−j), this is a sufficient condition for (yj,−hj(yj, y−j))
to maximize profit at price (p, q) in Gj(y−j). Choosing A such that A =∑n
j=1 hj(yj, y−j) the allowance market is cleared and one can implement the
wealth distribution (p · x1, . . . , p · xn) in order to implement the equilibrium
consumption xi as solutions to the consumers problems.
Hence, the opening of an allowance market based on one of the functions h1,
h2 or h3 allows the decentralization of the Pareto optima.
Moreover, in the differentiable case, (Compensation) is necessary to obtain a
complete decentralization result:
Theorem 2 Assume Z has a smooth boundary 5 and one of the utility func-
tions is smooth 6 and strictly concave. If (Compensation) does not hold, there
exist at least a Pareto Optimum which can not be decentralized as an equilib-
rium with allowances.
Proof: Assume (Compensation) does not hold, that is there exist a Pareto
optimal allocation (z, (xi)), and an associated price p such that for every (yj) ∈∏n
j=1 Yj(y−j) with
∑n
j=1 yj = z and for every λ > 0 there exist j such that
NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) 6⊂ NYj(y−j(yj)+λ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) > . As Z is smooth, NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj)
is a half-line and hence one in fact has that whatever (yj) and λ may be, for
some j one has: NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) ∩ NYj(y−j(yj) + λ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) = ∅.
Now, assume (z, (xi)), can be decentralized as an equilibrium with allowances,
((yj, αj), (xi)). The strict concavity and the smoothness of one of the utility
function imply the equilibrium price must be colinear to the price p given by
proposition 1. Hence the equilibrium price must be of the form (p, q) for some
q > 0. This equilibrium price must satisfy for every j, the first order condi-
tion for profit maximization at (yj, αj) : p ∈ NYj(y−j) + q∂hj(·, y−j)(yj). This
5 That is ∂Z is a C2-submanifold of RL of codimension 1.
6 C2.
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contradicts the preceding and hence ends the proof.
Hence the use of an allowance function satisfying (Compatibility) is a necessary
and sufficient condition to obtain a complete decentralization result thanks to
the opening of a single allowance market.
On the other hand, as in Laffont (11) decentralization results may also be ob-
tained through the setting of an appropriate tax scheme on the firms. Indeed,
consider that given an environment y−j, firm j is forced to pay a tax equal
to λhj(yj, y−j), the benefits of those taxes being allocated to consumers. One
can then define a price equilibrium with production tax as :
Definition 2 (Price Equilibrium with tax) A collection of production plans
(yj) ∈
∏n
j=1 Yj(y−j) together with a collection of consumption plans (xi) ∈
(RL++)m is a price equilibrium with production tax if there exist a price p ∈ RL+
a level of tax λ > 0 and an assignment of wealth levels (w1, . . . , wm) with∑m
i=1wi = p ·
∑n
j=1 yj such that:
(1) For all j, yj maximizes p · yj − λhj(yj, y−j) in Yj(y−j);
(2) For all i, xi maximizes ui(xi) in the budget set {xi ∈ RL+ | p · xi ≤ wi};
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω.
One then has
Theorem 3 Assume assumptions (P), (C), (G), (Decentralizability), (Al-
lowance) and (Compensation) hold. Any Pareto Optimum can be decentralized
as a Price Equilibrium with production tax.
Proof: Let (z, (xi)) be a Pareto optimal allocation and let us consider accord-
ing to theorem 2 an equilibrium with allowances, ((p, q), (yj, αj), (xi)) which
decentralize (z, (xi)). Setting λ = q and implementing the revenue scheme
(p · xi), such an equilibrium may be supported as an equilibrium with produc-
tion tax as the consumers and producers programs are equivalent to those at
the corresponding equilibrium with production allowances.
In fact the tax scheme is chosen such that firm j has to pay the exact amount it
was spending in production allowances at the competitive equilibrium decen-
tralizing the Pareto Optimum under consideration. Now, the setting of efficient
taxes is less convincing than the market decentralization as no mechanism can
be used in order to determine the optimal tax rate.
3 First Welfare Like Theorems
The decentralization results a` la Arrow-Laffont, (2) and (11), rely on the con-
frontation of supply and demand for external effects. Therefore the standard
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first welfare theorem provide a strong intuition that a first welfare theorem
will also hold in their framework. It is not the case here: the allowance mar-
ket drives the price to a Pareto Optimum supporting direction but nothing
guarantees that the equilibrium production always lies on the efficiency fron-
tier ∂Z. In this section, we consider two means the government can use to
strengthen its influence on the allowance market and on the equilibrium out-
come. The first one, through quantities, is to choose adequately the initial
allocation of allowances. The second one, through prices, is to provide addi-
tional allowances in exchange of commodity bundles and hence to influence
the equilibrium relation between the allowance and the commodities prices.
By either of these means, one can obtain a first welfare like theorem.
3.1 Choice of the initial allocation in allowances
By fixing the initial allocation of allowances at a suitable level, the govern-
ment can control the efficiency of the production process, provided the level of
allowances used characterize exactly the efficiency of the production process:
Assumption (Characterized Efficiency) There exist A ∈ R such that
for all (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) one has:
n∑
j=1
hj(yj, y−j) = A⇔
n∑
j=1
yj ∈ ∂Z
This assumption always holds for the allowance function h1 defined above but
not necessarily for h2 or h3.
On another hand, one must guarantee there will not exist equilibrium prices
that differ from the aggregate marginal cost of production. Two conditions are
necessary therefore. First, the influence of the allowance market must coincide
with the aggregate marginal cost of production. That is one must have:
Assumption (Exact Compensation) For all yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such that∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z, ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) is equal among all j and one has NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) =<
∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) > .
This condition is also satisfied by h1 (but also by h2 and h3).
Second, the producers behavior shall be governed by the allowance market.
Therefore we shall posit that:
Assumption (Over Optimism) For all yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such that∑nj=1 yj ∈
∂Z, one has TZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) ⊂
∑n
j=1 TYj(y−j)(yj) ( or equivalently
⋂
j=1···nNYj(y−j)(yj) ⊂
NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj))
11
This assumption is satisfied in particular when one of the individual technical
constraint is not binding. For example, in our framework, the over-optimism
of the producers and/or the presence of externalities (see section(4)) are likely
to lead to an interiority condition of the type for all yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such
that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z, one has for all j, yj ∈ intYj(y−j), which clearly implies
(Over Optimism). Also note that this assumption is labeled (Over-Optimism)
as it can be interpreted as stating the firms production sets encompass locally
the government one.
With those three additional assumptions, one can guarantee that for a well
chosen supply of allowances, the equilibria with allowances always are Pareto
optimal:
Theorem 4 Assume assumptions, (P), (C), (G), (Allowance), (Character-
ized Efficiency), (Over Optimism) and (Exact Compensation) hold. There ex-
ist an initial supply of allowances A such that (yj, αj), (xi) is an equilibrium
with allowances if and only if (
∑n
j=1 yj, (xi)) is a Pareto Optimum.
Proof: Let A be the level of allowances given by the assumption (Charac-
terized Efficiency) and (p, q, (yj, αj), (xi)) be an equilibrium with production
allowance for this level of allowances. As q 6= 0, for all j the constraint
αj ≤ −hj(yj, y−j) is necessary binding and therefore using clearance of the
allowance market, one gets
∑n
j=1 hj(yj, y−j) = A. Hence using (Characterized
efficiency) one has
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z.
Let us then prove that
∑n
j=1 yj maximizes profit in Z. As Z is convex, it suffices
to show that
∑n
j=1 yj satisfies the first order condition for profit maximization,
that is p ∈ NZ(∑nj=1 yj). Now, one has under assumption (Over Optimism)
that
⋂
j=1···nNYj(y−j)(yj) ⊂ NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) (∗).
Moreover, for all j as (yj,−hj(yj, y−j)) is profit maximizing in Gj(y−j) at
price (p, q), one has p ∈ NYj(yj) + q∂hj(yj, y−j). As ∂hj(yj, y−j) is equal
among j, this implies p − q∂hj(yj, y−j) ∈ ⋂j=1···nNYj(y−j)(yj) and hence p −
q∂hj(yj, y−j) ∈ NZ(∑nj=1 yj) because of (Over-Optimism). Using then (Exact
Compensation) one has ∂hj(yj, y−j) ∈ NZ(∑nj=1 yj) and hence p ∈ NZ(∑nj=1 yj).
Now, one can clearly implement the wealth distribution (p ·x1, . . . , p ·xn) in or-
der to implement the consumptions xi as solutions to the consumers problems.
One can then apply proposition 1 and conclude.
Conversely, any Pareto Optimum can be decentralized as an equilibrium with
allowances according to theorem 2. The (Characterized Efficiency) assumption
implies that the corresponding allocation of allowances must be equal to A.
Hence, one first obtains a “first welfare theorem” for allowance functions of
type h1.
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3.2 First welfare through the allowance price
The condition of constant endowment in allowances and the assumption of
(Characterized Efficiency) can be dispensed with if (Over-Optimism) holds
for all the production plans below the efficiency frontier:
Assumption (Strong-Over-Optimism) For all (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such
that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ Z, one has TZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) ⊂
∑n
j=1 TYj(y−j)(yj).
Note that this is satisfied in particular when for all yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such
that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ Z, there exist j such that yj ∈ intYj(y−j).
In this framework, efficiency can be achieved by linking allowance and com-
modities equilibrium prices through the government behavior. The mechanism
applied is based on the idea that one of the aims of the government when it
sets up the production allowance market is to prevent failures by the firms to
deliver the production they had announced. If the government owns a stock
of commodities corresponding to what it considers as the unrealizable part of
the production, it may substitute for the firms if they fail to deliver and using
its stock, supply the market at the announced level. The building of this stock
may be related to the allowance market if one considers that firms may obtain
from the government additional production allowances in exchange of com-
modities. Conversely if firms hold extra allowances they should be aloud to
sell them to the government at the market price of some reference commodity
bundle. The government hence clears the allowance market and imposes an
equilibrium relation between the commodities and the allowance prices.
Expressly, let γ ∈ RL++ be the reference commodity bundle used in the defini-
tion of the shortage function. The government is set to exchange allowances
against commodity bundles γ. If the firm wishes to obtain additional al-
lowances in exchange of commodities, the government simply create them
thanks to its legal prerogatives. If the firm wishes to obtain commodities in ex-
change of allowances, the government purchases the corresponding amount of
commodities on the market. Concerning the firms, the possibility to exchange
allowances against commodities adds the technology {(tγ,−t) ∈ RL+1 | t ∈ R}
to their existing production capacities. The production correspondence of firm
j is hence turned to
Hj(z−j) = {(yj, αj, βj) ∈ RL+2 | ∃zj ∈ Yj(z−j) yj = zj+βjγ , αj+βj ≤ −hj(zj, z−j)}
Note that the level of allowance exchanged against commodities, βj, and the
level of allowance obtained on the market,αj, are treated as separate variables.
This is a technical trick needed to keep track of the quantity of commodities
actually produced by the firm as zj = (yj − βjγ), which one needs to know
in order to compute the external effects and the allowance requirements. As
those two allowances can be turn one into the other at no cost, they somehow
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remain the same commodity, and the firms objective can be written as the
maximization of the profit (p, q) · (yj, αj + βj) in Hj(y−j − β−jγ).
When the government is assumed to systematically clear the market by ex-
changing the appropriate quantity g ∈ R of allowances against the value of the
corresponding number of commodity bundles γ, an equilibrium for the initial
allocation of allowances A is defined as:
Definition 3 [Equilibrium with allowance clearance]
A collection of production plans (yj, αj, βj) ∈
∏n
j=1Hj(y−j − β−jγ) together
with a collection of consumption plans (xi) ∈ (RL++)m form a price equilibrium
with allowance clearance if there exist a price (p, q) ∈ RL+1++ , a government
extra supply of allowances g = −∑nj=1 βj, and an assignment of wealth levels
(w1, . . . , wm) with
∑m
i=1wi = (p, q) · (
∑n
j=1 yj + (g +
∑n
j=1 βj)γ + ω,
∑n
j=1 αj +∑n
j=1 βj + A) such that:
(1) For all j,(yj, αj, βj) maximizes profit, (p, q) · (yj, αj + βj), in Hj(y−j −
β−jγ);
(2) For all i xi maximizes ui(xi) in the budget set {xi ∈ RL+ | p · xi ≤ wi};
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + (g +
∑n
j=1 βj)γ + ω;
(4)
∑n
j=1 αj +
∑n
j=1 βj + A = 0.
One should remark that clearance of the allowance market by the government
implies it must buy on the market the amount of commodities corresponding
to the allowance it gets back or conversely that it supplies the commodities
market with the bundles it obtains thanks to the extra allowances it supplies.
Firms have a dual behavior. This is why the term (
∑n
j=1 βj + g)γ enters the
equilibrium conditions on the commodities market, even though at equilibrium
this quantity is null. Moreover, in order to balance its budget the government
must wether set taxes on the consumers or subsidize them thanks to its surplus.
Those operations are implicitly encompassed in the assignment of the wealth
levels. An implicit assumption here is that the setting of those taxes (resp.
subsidies) does not entail any form of strategic behavior of the consumers.
Now, the fundamental issue is that at equilibrium the price of the allowance
is necessarily equal to this of the commodity bundle γ. That is:
q = p · γ (?)
Otherwise the firms would buy on the market an infinite amount of allowances
in order to exchange them against commodity bundles, or vice-versa. This
condition characterizes the ratio between the allowance price and the other
commodities prices. In order to control the equilibrium distance to ∂Z, it then
suffices to let it depend on this ratio and hence to choose allowance functions
such that the marginal rate of substitution between the production allowance
and the commodities is itself sensitive to the distance to ∂Z. One can choose
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for example, a particular case of h3, an allowance function of the form
hj(yj, y−j) = φ(g(yj +
∑
k 6=j
yk))− ψ(g(
∑
k 6=j
yk)).(??)
where φ is a strictly convex function such that φ′(0) = 1. Indeed, one can then
check that:
(1) ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) · γ ≤ 1 if and only if ∑nj=1 yj ∈ Z
(2) ∂hj(·, y−j)(yj) · γ = 1 if and only if ∑nj=1 yj ∈ ∂Z.
The strict convexity of φj implies the marginal rate of substitution between
production allowance and commodities increase with the distance to ∂Z (“with
the level of bad”). The normalization of the derivative is not important per
se. It must be understood in relation with the governmental exchange rate be-
tween commodities and allowances. Indeed, one will see below that an equilib-
rium price must satisfy q∂hj(yj, y−j) = p. Together with the price equilibrium
condition (?) (determined by the governmental exchange rate), it implies that
at equilibrium one must have ∂hj(yj, y−j) · γ = 1 which will guarantee ac-
cording to the preceding that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z. The same reasoning can be made
whenever the derivative of φ in 0 equals the exchange rate between allowance
and commodities. Finally, one has:
Theorem 5 Assume assumptions (P), (C), (G), (Strong Over Optimism)
hold and the allowance function is of the form (??). Any equilibrium with
allowance clearance is Pareto optimal.
Proof: Let (p, q, (yj, αj, βj), (xi)) be an equilibrium with allowance clearance.
The first order conditions for profit maximization for firm j at (p, q) are p ∈
NYj(yj) + q∂hj(yj, y−j) and p · γ = q. Taking the scalar product of this first
equation by γ we get, p ·γ = q ∈ NYj(yj) ·γ+q∂hj(yj, y−j) ·γ. As γ ∈ RL++ and
NYj(y−j)(yj) ∈ RL+, this implies q ≥ q∂hj(yj, y−j)·γ. and hence ∂hj(yj, y−j)·γ ≤
1. This implies according to the strict convexity assumption on the allowance
function, that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ Z. Now, as ∂hj(yj, y−j) is equal among j, one has
p−q∂hj(yj, y−j) ∈ ∩jNYj(y−j)(yj). Under (Strong Over Optimism) this implies
p − q∂hj(yj, y−j) ∈ NZ(∑nj=1 yj). Now wether p 6= q∂hj(yj, y−j) and hence
NZ(
∑n
j=1 yj) 6= {0} which implies
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z, wether p = q∂hj(yj, y−j)
which implies according to the preceding that ∂hj(yj, y−j) · γ = 1. The strict-
convexity of the allowance function then imply that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z as underlined
above. Anyhow, one has proved that
∑n
j=1 yj ∈ ∂Z, and the remaining of the
proof proceeds as in theorem 4.
As the analogous of theorem 2 clearly holds for equilibria with allowance
clearance, we have in fact proved that the equilibria with allowance clearance
coincide with the Pareto optima. This solves in particular the problem of
existence of an equilibrium with allowance clearance.
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4 Applications
Until now, the government production set and hence the optimality criterium
was exogenously given. Also, the relations between the firms and the govern-
ment expectations was not explicit. We now introduce links between those in
order to give a clearer interpretation of the preceding results.
4.1 Decentralization in an economy with production externalities
Let us first deal with the seminal problem of decentralization with externali-
ties presented in Arrow (2) and Laffont (11). That is the decentralization of
the Pareto optima with regards to the production capacities given by Yj. If
one then sets Z = {z | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) s.t z = ∑nj=1 yj} those Pareto op-
tima coincide with the “government Pareto optima” studied in the preceding
section.
Assumption (Decentralizability) clearly holds in this framework, so that if the
allowance functions are well chosen (e.g h1 to h3 above), one obtains a second
welfare theorem as a corollary of theorems 1 and 3 :
Corollary 1 Assume assumptions (P), (C), (G), (Decentralizability), (Al-
lowance) and (Compensation) hold. Any Pareto optimum with regards to Yj
can be decentralized as an equilibrium with production allowances or as an
equilibrium with production tax.
On the other hand, to implement first-welfare like theorems, one must check
that one of the over-optimism assumption holds. The strong form is irrele-
vant here as if it holds one can check every competitive equilibrium (without
any additional market) is Pareto optimal and there is no need to discuss the
properties of the allowance market.
However, the weaker form is likely to be satisfied. Expressly, it states that
when the aggregate production is efficient, the corresponding individual pro-
ductions are inefficient from the firms point of view (firms hence are locally
over optimistic). By contraposition, this is equivalent with saying that when
the firms consider their productions are efficient, the aggregate outcome in
fact is inefficient. That is the externalities always lead to inefficiency when the
firms are competitive. This holds when there is a strong correlation between
the production capacities and the environment, for example when the graphs
of the correspondences Yj are strictly convex (see the appendix for an explicit
proof).
It then suffices to choose an allowance function satisfying (Exact Compensa-
tion) and (Characterized Efficiency) in order to apply theorem 4 and to obtain
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a first-welfare like result. Namely:
Corollary 2 Assume assumptions, (P), (C), (G), (Allowance), (Exact Com-
pensation), (Over Optimism) and (Characterized efficiency) hold. There exist
an allocation in allowances A such that (yj, αj), (xi) is an equilibrium with
allowance if and only if ((yj), (xi)) is Pareto optimal with regards to the pro-
duction capacities Yj.
4.2 Errors in the production sector
Let us now come closer to the problematic described in the introduction by
explicitly considering the individual production correspondences are not accu-
rate. To give a precise meaning to this sentence, we introduce explicitly “true”
production possibilities at the individual level.
Indeed, we consider a situation where the “true ” production possibilities are
described by correpondences Zj : (RL)n → RL, Zj((y1, · · · , yn)) being the pro-
duction possibilities of firm j when the complete scheme of production plans
in the economy is (yj).
7 The government is informed of the aggregate produc-
tion possibilities Z = {z ∈ RL | ∃(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj(y1, · · · , yn) s.t ∑nj=1 yj = z}
but not necessarily of the true individual production correspondences. On the
other hand, the production possibilities perceived by the producers are given
by correspondences Yj : (RL)(n−1) → RL. We shall consider those are over-
optimistic in the sense of one of the earlier assumptions and of course that they
satisfy the (Decentralizability) requirement. One can for example think of the
case where Zj ⊂ intYj or even that the producers are not aware they face an
external effect and anticipate their production set are the ∪(yj)∈(RL)nZj((yj)).
In this framework, decentralization results are direct consequences of theorems
1 and 3:
Corollary 3 Assume assumptions (P), (C), (G), (Decentralizability),(Allowance)
and (Compensation) hold. Any Pareto optimum with regards to the production
capacities Zj can be decentralized in the economy with production capacities
Yj as an equilibrium with production allowance or as an equilibrium with pro-
duction tax.
Concerning first welfare like results, the introduction of the “true” production
correspondences Zj has add a new requirement on the individual choices of
the producers: one must now guarantee that the production plans are “truly”
feasible while theorems 4 and 5 only ensure the optimality and the feasibility
7 Such a definition for production correspondences is somehow unusual as it allows
producers to have an external effect on themselves. The motivations for such a
modelization are presented in the appendix.
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at the aggregate level. They can be applied here if individual and aggregate
feasibility coincide in the sense of:
Assumption (Feasibility Coincidence)
If (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) and ∑nj=1 yj ∈ ∂Z then (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj((yj)).
Theorems 4 and 5 then respectively yield:
Corollary 4 Assume assumptions, (P), (C), (G), (Convex Measures), (Exact
Compensation), (Over Optimism), ( Characterized Efficiency) and (Feasibility
Coincidence) hold. There exist an initial allocation in allowances A such that
(yj, αj), (xi) is an equilibrium with allowances of the economy with production
capacities Yj if and only if ((yj), (xi)) is Pareto optimal with regards to the
production capacities Zj.
Corollary 5 Assume assumptions, (P), (C), (G), (Strong Over Optimism)
and (Feasibility Coincidence) hold and the allowance function is of the form
(??). Any equilibrium with allowance clearance of the economy with production
capacities Yj is Pareto optimal with regards to the production capacities Zj.
Now, it seems clear that for Feasibility Coincidence to hold one must restrict
the type of errors the firms may make and the type of external effects they
may face. Roughly the assumption holds when errors and externalities are
uniform among the firms. More precisely:
Assumption (Repartition Neutrality ) Consider an environment (wj) ∈
Rn and a production scheme (zj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj((wj)) with ∑nj=1 zj ∈ ∂Z. For ev-
ery (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such that∑nj=1 yj = ∑nj=1 zj one has yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj((wj)).
Assumption (Uniform Externalities) For every (zj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(zj) and
(yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such that ∑nj=1 zj = ∑nj=1 yj ∈ ∂Z, one has Zj((zj)) =
Zj((yj)).
Lemma 2 Assumptions (Uniform Externalities) and (Repartition Neutrality)
imply (Feasibility Coincidence).
Proof: Let (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such that ∑nj=1 yj ∈ ∂Z. Hence there ex-
ist (zj) such that
∑n
j=1 zj =
∑n
j=1 yj and zj ∈
∏n
j=1 Zj(z1, · · · , zn). Using
assumption (Repartition Neutrality), one then has yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj(z1, · · · , zn).
On the other hand, assumption (Uniform Externalities) implies that for all j
Zj(y1, · · · , yn) = Zj(z1, · · · , zn). Hence one has (yj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj((yj)).
(Repartition Neutrality) states that for a given environment, the “true” fea-
sibility of a production scheme is independent of the repartition of the pro-
duction among the firms. (Uniform Externalities) states that the externality
faced by a producer depend only of the aggregate production level. It im-
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plies in particular that the externalities are not directed (i.e the source of
the externality does not matter ) and that the set of goods is comprehensive
enough to let the production process ( including external effects) be unam-
biguously characterized by the input-output combination implemented. The
relevance of those assumptions appears more clearly when the production
correspondences are thought to represent industries rather than individual
producers. Indeed, the state of the environment is then determined by the
sum of outputs of all industries (Uniform Externalities) and because the in-
dustries are specialized there usually is a sole way to allocate among them
the aggregate production (this implies (Repartition Neutrality)). Expressly,
one can consider there are k types of industries in the economy. To those k
types is associated a partition of the space of goods in k subsets such that a
firm of type k uses as input and produces as output only goods in the kth
subset. There exist an arbitrary number of firms of each type but the en-
vironmental constraint they face due to the other sectors of the economy is
collective. That is to say if Z1, · · · , Znk and Y1, · · ·Ynk are respectively the
“true ” and “ anticipated ”production correspondences of the firms of type
k, there exist a technico-environmental constraint function for the firms of
type k, Ek : RL × (RL)n−nk → R such that given an environment set up
by the other types firms production (wnk+1, · · ·wn) ∈ (RL)(n−nk) one has for
(y1, · · · ynk) ∈
∏nk
j=1 Yj(y1, · · · ynk , wnk+1, · · ·wn) :
(yj) ∈
n∏
j=1
Zj((y1, · · · ynk , wnk+1, · · ·wn))⇔ Ek(
n∑
j=1
yj, (wnk+1, · · ·wn)) ≤ 0.
Within such a framework, all the preceding assumptions hold.
5 Conclusion: an economy undergoing climate change
Let us now apply the preceding results to the model of an economy undergoing
climate change. This will allow us to get further insight on the interpretation
of the production allowance market and to compare its properties with those
of emission allowance markets which are actually used in real economies.
We consider a very simple model: an economy with L goods and two periods
of time. There is a single state of nature in the first period denoted by 0
and S states of nature in the second period, denoted by s = 1 · · ·S. Those
different states may summarize the uncertainty about climate change. There
is a complete set of contingent markets a` la Debreu (9) and we assume all the
transactions take place during the first period.
Climate change is due to greenhouse gases emissions in the first period and
affect the production possibilities in the second period. We denote by Yj(E) =
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(Y 0j , Y
1
j (E), · · · , Y Sj (E)) the production possibilities as expected by the pro-
ducers given an aggregate emission level E in the first period. On the other
hand, the true individual production possibilities are described by Zj(E) =
(Y 0j , Z
1
j (E), · · · , ZSj (E)) given an aggregate emission level E. Greenhouse gases
emissions are measured according to a function f of the aggregate production
in the first period. The government is well informed of the consequences of
climate change and can compute accurately the emissions. Hence it consid-
ers the aggregate production possibilities are given by Z = {(z0, z1, · · · , zs) |
∃(zj) ∈ ∏nj=1 Zj(f(∑nj=1 z0j )) , ∑nj=1 zj = z}.
In line with the arguments presented in the introduction, we shall assume
(Decentralizability) and (Strong Over Optimism) hold 8 in order to trans-
late the fact that the individual firms are less concerned than the government
by the influence of climate change on future production possibilities. We can
then embed this Climate Change Economy into the framework of section 4.2.
In particular, one can construct as before a production allowance market and
define equilibria with production allowances. Corollary 3 implies that every
Pareto Optimum with regards to Zj and ω, can be decentralized as a com-
petitive equilibrium with production allowances. Corollaries 4 and 5 entail
first-welfare like theorems. Hence the opening of a production allowance mar-
ket seems a suitable solution to decentralize the Pareto optima of the climate
change economy. According to theorem 2, it might even be the only one which
requires the opening of only one market.
However the interpretation of the production allowance is problematic as it
has two types of effects on the firms behavior. On the one hand it prevents
firms from emitting too much greenhouse gases in the first period and on the
other hand it prevents them from setting up over optimistic production plans
in the second period. Those two influences can be isolated and the production
allowance market is necessary only for the second purpose. The first one can
be dealt with an emission allowance market or with external effect markets a`
la Arrow.
Indeed, let us now consider that the government introduces an emission al-
lowance market in the first period. Therefore we assume that the aggregate
emission level f(z0) can be computed by adding individual emissions fj(z
0
j )
and that after allocating a quantity E of emission allowances to the firms, the
government forces them to detain the quantity of emission allowances corre-
sponding to their actual emission level ; the firms being aloud to trade those
emission allowances on a market. We moreover consider that the government
knows only the aggregate production set of the second period as a correspon-
dence depending of the aggregate level of emission and that this set can be
represented by a convex shortage function g(E, ·) with the total emission level
as a parameter. Now by setting a production allowance market for the second
period where firm j production allowance requirement is computed according
8 We also assume (P)(C)(G)
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to the corresponding hj(E, ·), the government leads the economy to open two
additional markets, one of emission allowance, one of production allowance.
In this framework the production set of firm j becomes
Cj(E, y
s
−j) = {(yj, αj, ξj) | yj ∈ Yj(E) , αj ≤ −hj(E, ysj , ys−j) , ξj ≤ −fj(y0j )}.
The behavior of the consumers remaining unchanged, we can then define a
price equilibrium of the climate change economy with production and emission
allowances as:
Definition 4 (Equilibrium of the climate change economy) Given a sup-
ply A of production allowance and a supply E of emission allowances, a col-
lection of production plans (yj, αj, ξj),∈
∏n
j=1Cj(E, y−j) together with a col-
lection of consumption plans (xi) ∈ (RL++)m is an equilibrium of the climate
change economy if there exist a price (p, q, r) ∈ RL+2+ and an assignment of
wealth levels (w1, . . . , wm) with
∑m
i=1wi = (p, q, r) · (
∑n
j=1 yj + ω,
∑n
j=1 αj +
A,
∑n
j=1 ξj + E) such that:
(1) For all j, (yj, αj, ξj) maximizes profit, (p, q, r) · (yj, αj, ξj), in Cj(E, y−j)
(2) For all i xi maximizes ui(xi) in the budget set {xi ∈ RL+ | p · xi ≤ wi}
(3)
∑m
i=1 xi =
∑n
j=1 yj + ω
(4)
∑n
j=1 αj + A = 0
(5)
∑n
j=1 ξj + E = 0
In a manner very similar to this of the proof of theorem 1, one can then prove
that every Pareto Optimum can be decentralized as an equilibrium of the
climate change economy: it suffices that the government chooses the optimal
level of emissions for the first period and then lets the emission allowance and
the production allowance markets operate. In the case of external effects a` la
Arrow or if firms use the emission allowance as a public good (See (7)) the op-
timal level of emissions might even be determined endogenously. Nevertheless,
the production allowance market remains necessary to transfer to the firms
information about the true production possibilities. Now, the main difference
between this equilibrium concept and these of the preceding sections is that
in the preceding, the production allowance market corrected indistinctly all
the failures wether they were due to the external effects or to errors in expec-
tations. Here, the production allowance market prevents firms from choosing
unrealistic production plans for the second period while the emission allowance
market controls the source of external effects.
As far as interpretation is concerned, the production allowance market can
then be seen as a medium used by the government to transfer to the firms
its expectations on the influence of climate change; that is a proxy for an
adaptation policy. Emission allowance market or external effects markets a` la
Arrow are, on the other hand, means to allocate efficiently the costs of reducing
greenhouse emission gases in the first period, tools for a mitigation policy.
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Now emission allowance markets are not efficient unless production allowance
markets also exist: recognizing the need for adaptation is a prerequisite for
efficient mitigation through an endogenous determination of the optimal level
of greenhouse gases emissions.
6 Appendix
6.1 Over-Optimism when the graphs of the production correspondences are
strictly convex
Let us show that the (Over-Optimism) assumption holds when the graphs of
the Yj are strictly convex. The main remark needed therefore is that the strict
convexity implies there is a unique way to write an element z ∈ ∂Z as the sum
of individual production plans (yj) ∈ ∏Yj(y−j). Indeed assume there exist two
distinct collections of production plans summing to z ∈ ∂Z. In other words
there exist (zj), (yj) ∈ ⋂GraphYj distinct and such that ∑nj=1 zj = ∑nj=1 yj ∈
∂Z. Strict Convexity of the graphs then imply 1
2
((zj)+(yj)) ∈ int(⋂GraphYj).
As
∑n
j=1
1
2
(zj + yj) = z, this implies z ∈ intZ which contradicts z ∈ ∂Z.
On the other hand it is easy to check that the Over-Optimism condition holds
if for every yj ∈ ∏nj=1 Yj(y−j) such that ∑nj=1 yj ∈ ∂Z, one has:
v ∈⋂NYj(y−j)(yj)⇒ (v, · · · , v) ∈ ⋂
{(zj)∈∩GraphYj |
∑n
j=1
zj=z}
n∑
j=1
NGraphYj(zj)
This is straightforward here, as according to the preceding {(zj) ∈ ∩GraphYj |∑n
j=1 zj = z} is a singleton and for all j one has:
v ∈ NYj(y−j)(yj)⇒ (0, · · · , 0, v, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ NGraphYj(yj).
6.2 Complement on the definition of the production correspondences Zj
The justification for letting the producers have an external effect on them-
selves is that we do not want to distinguish two external effects of the same
nature because they have a different source. It seems to us that this approach
is more appropriate for the intertemporal externalities we want to deal with
in the applications. Namely if there are m different types of externalities in
the economy and that given an environment defined by a vector of exter-
nalities (e1, · · · em), the production possibilities of firm j are Sj(e1, · · · em),
while the externalities are well determined as functions of the production
f1(y1, · · · , yn), · · · , fm(y1, · · · , yn), the production correspondence we consider
is Zj(y1, · · · yn) = {yj ∈ RL | yj ∈ S(f1(y1, · · · , yn) · · · fm(y1, · · · , yn))}. Note
22
that one can easily turn to the usual framework by letting Z ′j(y−j) = {yj ∈
RL | yj ∈ Zj(y−j, yj)}.
23
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